NEWARK, N.J. – A federal judge has dismissed a defamation claim brought by a City of Paterson employee against the municipality, ruling that the city cannot be held liable for intentional torts such as defamation under New Jersey law.
U.S. District Judge Stanley R. Chesler granted the city’s motion in limine, eliminating the final count of plaintiff David Gilmore’s lawsuit before trial.
The ruling ends Gilmore’s bid to hold the city responsible for what he alleged were malicious statements made against him.
Key Points
- Judge Stanley Chesler dismissed David Gilmore’s defamation claim against the City of Paterson
- The court ruled that municipalities cannot commit or be held vicariously liable for intentional torts
- Decision cites longstanding New Jersey precedent and the state Tort Claims Act
City cannot “entertain malice,” judge says
In his opinion, Chesler cited decades of New Jersey case law holding that municipalities, as public entities, cannot form the intent necessary to commit an intentional tort. He referenced O’Connor v. Harms, a 1970 appellate decision establishing that public corporations “cannot entertain malice” because they are artificial legal entities created to perform governmental functions.
The court further held that the New Jersey Tort Claims Act shields municipalities from liability for the acts of public employees involving malice, fraud, or willful misconduct. Chesler wrote that the statute reflects the state’s public policy of preventing government bodies from being sued for employees’ intentional wrongdoing.
Legal distinction rejected
Gilmore argued that the cited precedent did not directly apply because he was a municipal employee suing his own employer. The judge rejected that distinction, finding no legal basis to treat the claim differently from prior cases involving outside plaintiffs.
By dismissing Count Three of the complaint with prejudice, Chesler barred the defamation claim from being refiled, effectively ending that portion of the litigation. The remaining counts in Gilmore’s broader employment case were not addressed in this order.
